The problem
People and small teams need one place to keep passwords, documents and keys that is safe even if the hosting provider, the database, or the storage bucket is compromised. Most "encrypted" products encrypt at rest with a key the server holds, which protects against a stolen disk and nothing else.
What I worked on
I worked with the Sanders.Software team across the stack, and on QA: the NestJS API, the PostgreSQL schema, the React client, the storage layer on Cloudflare R2, and the key-management integration with AWS KMS.
Engineering decisions worth explaining
- Envelope encryption. Every file gets its own data key. That key is wrapped by a master key that lives in AWS KMS and never leaves it. A database leak on its own exposes nothing: the attacker has ciphertext and wrapped keys they can't unwrap.
- Ciphertext on R2, keys beside it. Files live on Cloudflare R2 to avoid egress fees; the wrapped key is stored alongside the ciphertext so a restore never depends on a separate key store being available.
- Postgres holds metadata, never plaintext. Names, sizes, sharing and audit history are queryable; the content isn't.
- Boring crypto. AES-256-GCM via the platform libraries, no hand-rolled primitives, and every operation is auditable per user and per object.
What I took away
- Key rotation is far cheaper to design at the start than to retrofit. Wrapping every data key under one KMS key is simple; re-wrapping thousands of them when the master rotates needs a job queue and a progress marker.
- Audit logs outgrow everything else. Logging every access is right, but the table wants partitioning before it becomes the largest thing in the database, not after.
Outcome
Live at encryptionwire.com and in production use at Sanders.Software.